Today’s Afghanistan

NATO, including Canada, has been in Afghanistan for seven years. What have the results been?

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4 Responses to Today’s Afghanistan

  1. David Zeglen says:

    Long-term security is necessary for a civil society to flourish, it doesn’t happen overnight.
    The return of millions of girls to school, the beginnings of a functional primary
    health-care system, micro-credit to women and parliamentary quotas for women MP’s are some
    examples of the progress made over the past seven years.

    The majority of Afghan society wants an international presence there according to various opinion polls conducted in all provinces of the country. The biggest fear ordinary Afghans have is that the ISAF will abandoned them or that there will be a backroom betrayal resulting in a civil war will ensue yet again at the hands of the Taliban.

    Of course military force alone isn’t going to bring peace to Afghanistan. But it will stabilize the country so that redevelopment efforts can go unhindered without the Taliban murdering aid workers.

    If you want to offer a nuanced critique of the ISAF mission, and how it could be improved to meet their objectives, that would be a lot more productive than implying the mission has been pointless. I’m sure that I’d even agree with some critiques that you have to offer.

    The fact that Canada is there right now is exactly what a Canadian army should be doing; fighting fascism. This post-Left positioning of the Afghanistan campaign is frankly disturbing, and the ‘troops out now’ position so commonplace in the “liberal” West has no support amongst Afghan women’s leaders.

  2. Yaacov says:

    Thanks for the comment! Could you provide links to the opinion polls you reference? I’m interested in learning more.

    If I felt that our troops were securing the rebuilding of civil society and good government in Afghanistan and effectively quelling armed resistance, I would agree with your arguments. The problem isn’t simply that lots of people are being killed (though that is a huge problem), it’s also that our troops aren’t succeeding at their mission. Check out the first link in the post, which has a table and graph showing coalition casualties by year. Since 2004 casualties have been steadily growing at a rate of about 50% a year. That indicates that armed resistance is growing, rather than being quelled by our troops.

    It’s much harder to find a number that summarizes the effectiveness of rebuilding efforts, but one that gives a sense of rule of law and economic rebuilding is opium production. Like ISAF casualties, the higher this number, the worse we are doing. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2008 notes that 2001, with the Taliban in control was by the lowest year for opium production, which then rose during the NATO occupation, quickly exceeding the greatest production year during the Taliban government. There was finally a dip in 2008 which the report points out was partly due to decreased world opium demand and increased food prices in Afghanistan. There was a similar dip in 2005, but production resumed apace in 2006.

    I don’t doubt that withdrawing troops would have violent consequences for civilians in many parts of the country. The best course of action would have been not to send troops in at all, but now we’re stuck with only bad options. Given the increasing casualty figures and undemocratic leadership, it seems likely that the troops will eventually be forced to withdraw. It makes more sense to leave now than to stay and give the insurgents more time and incentive to build weapons stockpiles, which will likely make the post-occupation conflict more dangerous to the people of Afghanistan.

  3. David Zeglen says:

    The Asia Foundation just finished a comprehensive survey of Afghanistan for 2009, which you can find on their webpage at http://www.asiafoundation.org.

    I don’t see how a direct casual relationship is being formed by increased troop deaths being equated to the mission failing. Increased troop deaths usually mean more combat missions to provide security in the provinces. If the Taliban is increasing its size, that’s because of its cozy relationship with Iranian backers, Pakistan’s ISI, and oh yes, illegal narcotics, not to mention Al-Queda operatives from oil-rich countries. Increased troop deaths speak more about ideology than they do about NATO’s mission.

    I hardly see how since 2003, an increase in troop deaths conclusively proves the mission is failing. You’re absolutely right, in 2001, opium production was at it’s lowest because of the Taliban. The Taliban also executed men, women and children who flew kites, listened to Western music, didn’t have their beards a proper length or left the house without a male companion. The economy was also in a complete free fall and insecurity ran rampant. People feared for their lives in everything they did. Small price to pay I suppose if you have a low rate of opium production right? I think your fixation on opium production is missing what the situation is like in Afghanistan. I recommend you read more on the opium trade in Afghanistan; its a very nuanced and difficult problem in the country with a long history:

    http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/third-way-ending-illusions-in.html
    http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,473933,00.html

    Your two pieces of data (troop deaths and opium production) that “confirm” the ISAF is failing in their mission isn’t a very convincing argument. The effectiveness of rebuilding efforts has reaped considerable benefits for the people of Afghanistan, but it’s not over and it takes a continued foreign presence there.

    I already mentioned to you how much life has changed in Afghanistan since the Taliban were ousted in 2001. Eight years later, millions of girls are in school, the country has a constitutional government, more than 80 per cent of the people have basic access to health care, almost all children have been immunized against polio and childhood diseases and nearly five million refugees have returned to the country.

    If you think it makes sense to leave now, then I suggest you see if your views correspond to the Afghan people, by talking to some. Having worked with Afghans ranging from progressives, liberals, secularists, human rights activists and other feminists, no one responds to the ‘troops out’ position so popular in the West with anything other than contempt. They know it’s not perfect, but it’s creating real and gradual change and it won’t happen overnight.

    Withdrawing would be an utter betrayal of the trust Afghans have placed in providing them with security and training their army.

  4. Yaacov says:

    David, thank you for the comment. It’s very helpful to have a chance to debate this with some who has been in Afghanistan. I was hoping to have a chance to read the Asia Foundation study, but the last couple of weeks have kept me occupied.

    I’ll accept your argument that opium production is not a general indicator of social justice. Indicators about government corruption and military incompetence and abuse continue to suggest to me that there are major hurdles to be overcome in Afghanistan, and that the significant amount of time that NATO troops have spent there has not achieved the stated goals of political and social reconstruction. If these goals have not been achieved in the last eight years, why would we expect them to be achieved in the next eight?

    You say that the increase in numbers of Taliban fighters is due to “Iranian backers, Pakistan’s ISI, and oh yes, illegal narcotics, not to mention Al-Queda operatives from oil-rich countries.” While all of those are factors, none of them are providing significant numbers of fighters to the Taliban. They provide resources, but it is Afghans who do the fighting. Why are Afghans fighting NATO troops if the troops have brought improvements that they are happy with?

    As for the argument that an increase in troop deaths simply means that patrols are happening in a wider area, the question is why would we then see a consistent, year over year increase in troop deaths? If patrols are consistently increasing in scale, then they are not succeeding in making areas safe. And how much longer do we expect the increase to continue?

    As for talking to Afghans, I hope you’ll agree that talking to individuals, especially the individuals most accessible to foreign nationals, is not an unbiased source. I don’t dismiss it out of hand, but I’m wary given the extensive experience of international development practitioners (who are not linked to a large military force) with people telling them what they want to hear.

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